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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS*
I. Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights1 is an agreement designed
to secure international recognition and observance of those human rights con-
sidered necessary in a democratic society. The Convention is the first inter-
national agreement to integrate a concern for the protection of human rights
with an enforcement procedure to ensure that Member States comply with their
obligation to uphold those rights. The Convention's enforcement apparatus
consists of two organs: the European Commission of Human Rights2 and the
European Court of Human Rights.'
The Commission, a quasi-judicial body, serves a dual function. First, the
Commission determines whether an application alleging a breach of the Conven-
tion is admissible for consideration on its merits. The criterion used by the Com-
mission in determining admissibility is whether there is some indication of a
breach of the Convention. An application may be brought by an individual
claiming to be the victim of a violation by a Member State or by one Member
State against another.4 Second, the Commission determines the merits of an
application by investigating the facts of the application and deciding whether
there has been a breach of the Convention. The Commission decides the admis-
sibility and the merits of an application in separate proceedings, receiving evi-
dence and submissions from the parties in adversary form. Although the Com-
mission's determination of admissibility is conclusive, its decision on the merits
of an application is not.
The final decision on the merits of an application is made by the Court,
the authoritative body of the Convention. The Court's jurisdiction to determine
the merits of an application, however, depends upon a favorable determination
of admissibility by the Commission.'
The power of the Commission and Court to determine breaches of the
Convention and to hold Member States accountable for violations of human
* The author wishes to thank Professor James E. S. Fawcett and David Newell, Esq., for
their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this note.
1 The European Convention on Human Rights, signed in Rome on November 4, 1950,
took effect on September 3, 1953. Seventeen nations have ratified the Convention: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Hereinafter cited as the Convention.
2 Hereinafter cited as the Commission.
3 Hereinafter cited as the Court.
4 In the case of an individual application, the Commission may only deal with the matter
after the applicant has exhausted all his domestic remedies.
5 Article 45 of the Convention provides: "[The jurisdiction of the Court extends to all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention referred to it by a Mem-
ber State or the Commission?"
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rights distinguishes the Convention from other international agreements.6 Most
international conventions do not encompass enforcement procedures and as a
result share a common characteristic: impotence.
The Convention's ability to protect human rights is seriously threatened,
however, by the doctrine of margin of appreciation. Under this doctrine, the
Commission and Court extend to Member States a certain margin or latitude in
determining whether or not a Member State has violated the Convention. The
exact nature of the doctrine and of the threat that it poses to the effectiveness
of the Convention is best illustrated by the Handyside Case, the latest and most
dramatic application of the doctrine.
This note analyzes the development of the concept of margin of appre-
ciation. This analysis provides the context necessary for a full assessment of the
scope and significance of the doctrine as applied in the Handyside Case.
II. The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation:
Its History Prior to the Handyside Case
A. Margin of Appreciation and Article 15 of the Convention
Initially employed by the Commission in 1956, the doctrine of margin of
appreciation originated in a series of applications involving Article 15 of the
Convention. Article 15 states that in time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation, a Member State may take measures derogating
from certain of its obligations under the Convention. The Article restricts such
measures, however, to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.!
The first case in the series involved an application brought by Greece against
the United Kingdom concerning the United Kingdom's alleged nonobservance
of the Convention in Cyprus.' Greece submitted that the United Kingdom's
invocation of Article 15 failed to satisfy the emergency conditions required under
the Article. The British government maintained that at the time of its derogation
there existed in Cyprus a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation"
due to repeated acts of violence (murder and sabotage) aimed at the subversion
of the lawful government of Cyprus. The United Kingdom alleged that it was
forced to institute certain emergency measures of detention and deportation.
6 Member States undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which
they are parties. If the Court finds that a decision or measure taken by a Member State con-
flicts with that State's obligations under the Convention, the decision of the Court shall afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.
7 Article 15 of the Convention provides:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation....
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 '(paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this
provision.
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall
keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the pro-
visions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
8 The Cyprus Case, [1958-59] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 174.
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These measures resulted in an encroachment of Article 5, which provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person."
The application was declared admissible. The Commission held that it was
competent to ascertain both whether a public emergency existed in Cyprus and
whether the measures enlisted by the United Kingdom were consistent with the
Article 15 requirement that emergency measures be strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation. Significantly, the Commission noted its willingness, in
an application involving derogation from the Convention under Article 15, to
extend to the derogating Member State "a certain measure of discretion in assess-
ing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."9 In the Cyprus
Case, therefore, the Commission conceived the margin of appreciation as a means
by which it could grant to Member States experiencing a state of emergency the
benefit of the doubt as to compliance with their obligations under the Convention.
The doctrine of margin of appreciation was again utilized in Lawless v.
Ireland."° The case involved an application brought by an individual, Lawless,
who contended that his arrest and detention without charge or trial contravened
Article 5 of the Convention. In its defense, Ireland submitted that the arrest and
detention of Lawless were committed pursuant to a 1940 emergency act. The
emergency act empowered the Irish government to arrest and detain persons
without trial when the government considered the exercise of such powers neces-
sary to preserve peace and public order.
The questions facing the Commission were: (1) whether at the time of
Lawless' arrest and continuing detention there existed a state of emergency in
Ireland within the meaning of Article 15 and (2) whether the arrest and deten-
tion of Lawless without trial were measures "strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation." The Commission held by a majority of 9 to 5 that a public
emergency threatening the life of the Irish nation did exist. By a majority of
8 to 6, the Commission decided that the measures of arrest and detention were
justified as "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." Thus, the Com-
mission held that the Irish government had committed no breach of the Con-
vention. In view of the importance of the issues raised by the Lawless application
and the substantial minority vote, the Commission referred the case to the Court
for an authoritative decision. 1
Commissioner Waldock, President of the Commission, testified before the
Court in support of the Commission's judgment. His testimony is often cited as
the best explanation of the rationale of the doctrine of margin of appreciation:
[The Commission] does recognize that the question of whether or not to
employ exceptional powers under Article 15 involves problems of apprecia-
tion and timing for a government which may be most difficult, and especially
difficult in a democracy ... where governments are always susceptible to the
impact of public opinion. It also recognizes that the government has to
balance the ills involved in a temporary restriction of fundamental rights
9 Id. at 176.
10 Lawless v. Ireland, [1958-59] 2 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUIAN R IGHTS.
11 The Lawless Case, [1960-61] 3 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 492 (merits).
The Court dismissed Lawless's complaint. The Court held that the Irish Government was
entitled under Article 15 to take the measures challenged by Lawless.
[October 1977]
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against even worse consequences than for the people and perhaps larger dis-
locations than of fundamental rights and freedoms, if it is to put the situation
right again. The concept behind [margin of appreciation in the context of
Article 15] is that Article 15 has to be read in the context of the rather special
subject matter with which it deals: The responsibilities of a government for
maintaining law and order in a time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. The concept of the margin of apprecia-
tion is that a government's discharge of these responsibilities is essentially
a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and of balancing con-
flicting considerations of the public interest; and that, once the Commission
or Court is satisfied that the government's appreciation is at least on the
margin of the powers conferred by Article 15, then the interest which the
public itself has in effective government and in the maintenance of order
justifies and requires a decision in favor of the legality of the government's
appreciation.'2
The third and final case involving Article 15 is the Greek Case." The
Greek Case involved applications brought by four Member States" alleging vio-
lations of the Convention by the Greek revolutionary government that had come
into power in April, 1967. The government invoked Article 15 by Royal Decree
on April 21, 1967, thereby suspending provisions of the Greek constitution that
corresponded to Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention." Greece justified
its actions by citing the existence of political instability that allegedly threatened
the public order and the security of the Greek state.
The first issue facing the Commission was whether on April 21, 1967, a
public emergency, actual or imminent, did in fact exist. Although acknowledging
its "constant jurisprudence"'" concerning the margin of appreciation afforded
Member States under Article 15, the Commission rejected Greece's contention
that a public emergency existed on April 21, 1967. The Commission thus found
Greece's derogations unjustified and in breach of the Convention. 7
Two dissenting opinions in the Greek Case highlight the significance of the
case to the development of the doctrine of margin of appreciation. Commissioner
Eustathiades' dissent focused on the Commission's modification of the doctrine
in the Greek Case compared to its application in the Cyprus and Lawless cases.
12 C. MORRISSON, THE DEVELOPING EUROPEAN LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 150 n.170
(1967).
13 The Greek Case, [1969] 12 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
14 Application numbers 3321/67 Denmark v. Greece, 3322/67 Norway v. Greece, 3323/67
Sweden v. Greece, 3344/67 Netherlands v. Greece filed with Commission in Sentember 1967,
joined October 20, 1967, all four applications declared admissible. [1968] 11 Y.B. EUR. CONv.
ON HUMAN IGHTS 690.
15 Article 5 provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. Article
6 provides that in the determination of civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence. Article 10 provides
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Article 11 provides that everyone has the
right to freedom of assembly and to freedom of association with others.
16 12 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 72.
17 The Commission transmitted a report of its findings to the Committee of Ministers in
November, 1968 in accordance with Convention procedure. On the Committee's adoption of
a resolution making the report of the Commission's findings public, the Greek government
in December, 1969 denounced the European Convention, and in accordance with Convention
procedure its denunciation operated as a release of Greece from membership in the Convention
in 1970. Greece was readmitted to membership and re-ratified the Convention in 1974.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Eustathiades maintained that in past applications of the doctrine of margin
of appreciation, the Commission had been careful to examine both whether a
state of emergency actually existed in the Member State while emergency mea-
sures were in effect and whether the measures were "strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation." Eustathiades pointed out that in the Cyprus Case,
the Commission had considered alternative emergency measures available to the
United Kingdom and whether such measures would have been adequate to deal
effectively with the emergency situation in Cyprus. Similarly, in the Lawless
Case, he asserted, the Commission and Court had undertaken extensive research
to discover whether alternative solutions, less oppressive than arrest and detention
without charge or trial, would have been sufficient to deal with Ireland's emer-
gency. Eustathiades criticized the Commission's fact-finding process as incapable
of making an accurate assessment whether Greece had acted within the margin
of appreciation. Further, he objected to the Commission's failure to obtain "full
and detailed evidence of the facts""8 necessary for an appreciation of both the
Greek government's stability and the necessity of the emergency measures it had
adopted.
Commissioner Susterhenn's dissent sets forth the rationale of the doctrine as
presently applied. Susterhenn explained his understanding of the doctrine of
margin of appreciation as follows:
In the examination of the question whether or not there is a threat to the
life of the nation the right of decision lies with the responsible Government
within the limits of its bona fide discretion. In its review of this decision the
Commission is not entitled to put itself in the position of the responsible
Government and assume the functions of a sort of super government. The
Commission has rather to examine whether the respondent Government in
exercising its discretion has not manifestly behaved in an unreasonable or
even arbitrary manner.19 (emphasis added)
B. Extension of the Doctrine to Other Articles in the Convention
In its inception, the doctrine of margin of appreciation was exclusively
applied to cases involving a national emergency under Article 15. The Com-
mission and Court, however, soon extended the doctrine to non-emergency arti-
cles as well. In particular, the doctrine has been applied to Articles 8 through
11 of the Convention. The individual rights reserved in Articles 8 through 11
are, respectively: the right to respect for private and family life, the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the right to freedom of expression,
and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association with others.
These rights are not absolute under the Convention, however, since each
of these articles incorporates a "clause of exceptions." A "clause of exceptions"
within a particular article permits a Member State to impose certain restrictions
on the enumerated right. To be compatible with the Convention, these restric-
tions must be "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of either national
security, public order, health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. The
18 12 Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMtAN RIGHTS 108.
19 Id. at 87.
[October 1977]
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"clause of exceptions" therefore permits a Member State limited discretion to
restrict the rights contained in Articles 8 through 11.
By applying the doctrine of margin of appreciation to Article- 8 through 11,
the Commission and Court have extended to Member States unlimited discretion
to restrict the enumerated rights. In effect, Member States may impose restric-
tions without regard to whether such restraints are necessary in a democratic
society.2" Thus, the doctrine has been used to circumvent the express require-
ments of the Convention.
The potential for abuse inherent in this approach is best illustrated by the
cases involving Article 10. These cases illustrate that by applying the doctrine
to the non-emergency articles, the Commission and Court have effectively abdi-
cated their powers of enforcement under the Convention and have thereby jeop-
ardized the individual rights and freedoms contained therein.
C. Article 10 and the Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation
Article 10 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
The Article also sets forth a "clause of exceptions," which provides:
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Under the clause of exceptions, a Member State may subject the right to
freedom of expression to "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties" under
several categories. The most frequently litigated of these categories are: national
20 The following cases best illustrate the unlimited discretion that the doctrine of margin
of appreciation allows Member States in restricting the rights contained in Articles 8 through
11:
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life): X v. Sweden, Application
911/60 [1961] 4 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 198. X v. Netherlands, Application
1449/62 [1963] 6 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 262.
Article 9 (the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion): X v. Netherlands,
Application 1068/61 [1962] 5 Y.B. EuR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 278.
Article 10 (the right to freedom of expression): X v. Austria, Application 753/60 [1960]
3 Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 310. X v. Austria, Application 1747/62 [1963] 6 Y.B.
EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 424. X and the German Association of Z v. the Federal
Republic of Germany, Application 1167/61 [1963] 6 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
204. Dona and Schul v. Netherlands, Applications 5354/72 and 5370/72 [1972] 15 Y.B.
EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 508. X v. Austria, Application 5777/72 [1974] 45 COLL.
DEc. 87. Case of Engel et d. Jun. 8, 1976, Series Anno. 22 (Opinion of the Court).
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security, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of the reputation or rights
of others, and the protection of morals. Although each of these categories is
susceptible of abuse, restrictions in the interests of national security, prevention
of disorder or crime, and reputation or rights of others, are at least capable of
objective scrutiny.
The category "protection of morals," however, is so vague as to be mean-
ingless. The Convention provides no limitations to clarify the meaning of the
protection of morals. Yet a Member State may classify a restrictive measure as
necessary for the protection of morals and thus deprive an individual of his
right to freedom of expression. In view of this potential for abuse, one would
expect the Commission and Court to examine carefully any Member State's claim
that a measure restricting the right to freedom of expression is necessary for the
protection of morals. It is clear, however, that this is not the case. Rather, the
Commission and Court mechanically apply the doctrine of margin of appre-
ciation to such cases. As a result, the quality and scope of the right to freedom
of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention have been greatly dis-
torted.
III. The Handyside Case
A. An Overview
On April 13, 1972, Richard Handyside, London publisher, filed an appli-
cation with the Commission claiming that the United Kingdom had violated
his Article 10 right to freedom of expression. The basis for Handyside's appli-
cation was his conviction under the United Kingdom Obscene Publications Act
of 1959, partially amended in 1964,21 for the possession of copies of The Little
Red Schoolbook2 for publication for gain.23 Handyside was found guilty of
offenses under the Acts in Magistrates Court in July, 1971. He appealed his
conviction to the Inner London Quarter Sessions, which affirmed the decision
of the Magistrates Court.
On April 14, 1974, the Commission declared Handyside's application ad-
missible for further examination on the merits.14 On September 30, 1975, in its
decision on the merits, the Commission rejected Handyside's claim. The Com-
mission referred the case to the Court on January 12, 1976.
The United Kingdom submitted to the Court that its interference with
Handyside's right to freedom of expression was justified under the clause of
exceptions in subsection 2 of Article 10. The United Kingdom maintained that
21 Hereinafter cited as the Acts.
22 S. HANSEN & J. JENSEN, THE LITTLE RED SCHOOLBOOK (1971) [hereinafter cited as
THE SCHOOLBOOK].
23 Prohibition of publication of obscene matter under the Acts:
Section (1) Subject as hereinafter provided, any person who, whether for gain
or not publishes an obscene article (or who has an obscene article for publication for
gain (whether gain to himself or gain to another)) shall be liable-
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months;
(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years or both.
24 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Application 5493/72 [1974] 45 COLL. DEC. 23.
[October 1977]
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the Acts' restrictions on the right to freedom of expression were "prescribed by
law" and "necessary in a democratic society" "for the protection of morals."
Thus, the United Kingdom argued, Handyside's prosecution and conviction
under the Acts did not violate Article 10.
On December 7, 1976, the Court accepted the United Kingdom's reasoning
and rejected Handyside's application. The Court held that both the Acts and
the United Kingdom's decision to apply the Acts to Handyside were reasonable
within the margin of appreciation afforded Member States by subsection 2 of
Article 10. Thus, the Acts and the application of the Acts to Handyside were
held compatible with the United Kingdom's obligation under the Convention
to respect the right to freedom of expression. 5
B. Proceedings Before the Commission26
Handyside submitted that the Acts themselves as well as their application
to him violated his right to freedom of expression. He argued that the Acts were
incompatible with the Convention due to the vague definition of obscenity em-
ployed in the Acts." According to Handyside, this vagueness enabled the police
and Director of Public Prosecutions to take arbitrary action. Views critical of
current establishment values in British society could thus be suppressed under
the rubric of obscenity. Handyside argued that The Schoolbook had been
judged obscene by the English courts because the book presented political and
philosophical views inconsistent with establishment thinking. Thus, he asserted,
the prosecution of The Schoolbook was directed at the book's political contents,
not at the protection of the morals of children.
To support his contention, Handyside argued that the Inner London Court's
opinion demonstrated that the true function of the Acts was to censor social ideas
rather than to protect the morals of the young. The Inner London Court held
that The Schoolbook's extreme subversive tone tended to undermine the idea of
marriage as a social institution, the need for restraint in sexual matters, and the
responsible influences of the Church, parental authority, and youth organizations.
In addition, the Inner London Court held The Schoolbooks anti-authoritarian
stance inimical to good teacher-child relationships.
Handyside noted that at the time of publication of The Schoolbook, a large
proportion of the British press considered the book a serious contribution to
25 The Handyside Case, Eur. Ct. Human Rights (Dec. 7, 1976).
26 The first obstacle Handyside faced in filing an application with the Commission was
Article 26, which provides that the Commission may only consider an application after all
domestic remedies available to the applicant have been exhausted.
27 Test of obscenity under the Acts:
(1) For the purpose of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its
effect or (where the article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any
one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt per-
sons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear
the matter contained or embodied in it.
(2) In this Act "article" means any description of article containing or embody-
ing matter to be read or looked at or both, any sound record, and any film or other
record of a picture or pictures.
(3) For the purpose of this Act a person publishes an article who




English education. Handyside also pointed out that not one review had found
either The Schoolbook as a whole or its most highly publicized aspect, the sec-
tion on sex, obscene.
In response, the United Kingdom contended that the doctrine of margin
of appreciation left to Member States the right to determine the limits on certain
of the rights in the Convention. The United Kingdom argued that subsection 2
of Article 10 established the government's right to control, through appropriate
legislation, the publication and distribution of obscenity. The United Kingdom
maintained that the Acts represented legitimate legislative control "prescribed
by law" and "necessary in a democratic society" "for the protection of morals."
According to the United Kingdom, therefore, the Acts were compatible with
the individual's right to freedom of expression reserved in Article 10.
The United Kingdom also asserted that the application of the Acts to
Handyside was justifiable under subsection 2 of Article 10. In support of its
position, the United Kingdom cited the Inner London Court's findings that:
(1) The Schoolbook was intended for and likely to be read by school children
of the age of 12 and above, and (2) The Schoolbook tended to deprave and
corrupt children who were likely to read it as the book did not present alternative
views, and thus prevented children from forming a balanced view of the sub-
jects of discussion.
8
A majority of the Commission proceeded as though it were a Court of
Appeal. The majority merely reviewed the judgments of the English courts and
concluded that the courts had acted reasonably, in good faith, and within the
limits of the margin of appreciation afforded under subsection 2 of Article 10.
Thus, the Commission dismissed Handyside's claim that his right to freedom of
expression had been violated.
In adopting this approach, the majority completely disregarded its obligation
under Article 10. The Commission was bound to determine whether the inter-
ference with Handyside's right to freedom of expression was necessary for the
protection of morals in a democratic society. Under Article 10, necessity and
not reasonableness should be the yardstick by which the Commission measures a
Member State's interferences with an individual's right to freedom of expression.
The Commission must objectively assess whether the facts of an application
reveal an unlawful interference by a Member State with an individual's right to
freedom of expression. In the Handyside Case, the Commission was thus under
a duty to determine the true nature of The Schoolbook, the necessity of the Acts
themselves, and the necessity of Handyside's prosecution under the Acts for the
protection of morals. Moreover, the Commission was under a duty to make these
determinations in a manner separate and apart from the English courts.
A sizeable minority of the Commission in the Handyside Case rejected the
doctrine of margin of appreciation. The minority chose instead to examine
28 The alleged absence of alternative views in THE SCHOOLBOOK should not serve as a
basis upon which to justify a finding of obscenity. The establishment views of the Church,
parental authority, and youth organizations wield a far greater influence than the occasional
non-establishment publication such as THE SCHOOLBOOK. Do publications of the Church and
youth organizations present children with a balanced view on subjects discussed, i.e., with




The Schoolbook and the necessity of Handyside's prosecution under the Acts
without relying on the findings of the English courts. Nevertheless, the majority
of the Commission examined only the reasonableness and the good faith of the
English courts, and on those bases rejected Handyside's application.
C. Opinion of the Court29
Unfortunately, the Court followed the misguided approach of the Com-
mission. The Court extended the doctrine of margin of appreciation to the
United Kingdom, stating:
"[I]t is no way the Court's task to take the place of the competent national
court but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered in the
exercise of their power of appreciation.""0
The Court concluded that "the competent English judges were entitled, in
the exercise of their discretion, to think at the relevant time that The Schoolbook
would have pernicious effects on the morals of many of the children and adoles-
cents who would read it."3'
Thus, the Court relied on the English courts' conclusions as the basis for
its rejection of Handyside's claim and did not conduct an independent assess-
ment of The Schoolbook.
In its opinion, the Court referred only to those passages of The Schoolbook
specifically quoted or mentioned by the English courts. For example, the Court
accepted the English courts' characterization of the following passage as indi-
cative of The Schoolbook's overall tendency to undermine children's respon-
sibility to the community:
"Be Yourself'
3 2
Maybe you smoke pot or go to bed with your boy friend or girl friend and
don't tell your parents or teachers, either because you don't dare to or just
because you want to keep it secret. Don't feel ashamed or guilty about
doing things you really want to do and think are right just because your
parents or teachers might disapprove. A lot of these things will be more
important to you later in life than the things that are "approved of."
The Court found objectionable the passage's lack of reference to the illegal-
ity of smoking marijuana, despite the fact that this was expressed in the next
section in the book on drugs.
The Court referred to a passage headed "Intercourse and Petting"3 3 in
The Schoolbook's section on sex as a further example of the book's tendency to
deprave and corrupt, on the grounds that the passage gave children no warning
as to the desirability of restraint in sexual activity. Also found unsatisfactory
was the following passage, which appeared under the heading of "Pornog-
rap h y : ,,s4
29 The Commission referred The Handyside Case to the Court for a decision whether the
facts of the case disclosed a breach by the United Kingdom of its obligations under Article 10.
30 The Handyside Case, supra note 25, at 18.
31 Id. at 19.
32 THE SCHOOLDOOK at 77.
33 Id. at 97-98.
34 Id. at 105.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Porn is a harmless pleasure if it isn't taken seriously and believed to be real
life. Anybody who mistakes it for reality will be greatly disappointed.
But it is quite possible that you will get some good ideas from it and you may
find something which looks interesting and that you haven't tried before.
The Court found the "sane and sensible" first paragraph marred by the
second paragraph's suggestion that children might find ideas worth adopting in
pornography. The Court foresaw "the real likelihood that a substantial number
of children would feel it incumbent to look for and practice such things." 5 The
Court concluded: "Such acts might very well be criminal offenses just like
smoking pot and sexual intercourse between a boy of at least 14 and a girl not
yet 16. The expression 'to deprave and corrupt' must include the admission of
or the encouragement to commit criminal offenses of that kind."36
Although the Court acknowledged the high quality of The Schoolbook's
treatment of contraceptives, homosexuality, venereal diseases and abortion, it held
that these sections could not outweigh the tendency of the cited passages to
deprave and corrupt a significant number of the children likely to read it.
By relying on the doctrine of margin of appreciation and accepting a
diminished, secondary role whereby only the reasonableness of the English courts'
judgments was reviewed, the Court presented an inaccurate, distorted picture of
The Schoolbook. In its description and treatment of The Schoolbook, the Court,
by its concentration on the 26-page section on sex, the 2-page section on pornog-
raphy and the Y2-page section entitled "Be Yourself," neglected to account for
179Y pages of the book. The Court was thus unable to obtain a balanced view
of The Schoolbook.
Included within The Schoolbook's remaining 179V pages was a 32-page
section on the dangers of drug abuse.17 The section begins by defining drugs as
"poisons which can have a pleasant effect" and states: "They [drugs] can affect
your body directly. And they can be habit-forming or addictive, which means
that you can become mentally or physically dependent on them."3 The School-
book then gives an individual and detailed breakdown of various drugs, out-
lining their detrimental effects and dispelling the myths associated with each.
After listing references to accurate books on drugs, material on how the police
and courts deal with drug offenders, and several London addresses where chil-
dren may turn for help with drug problems, the section ends on the following
cautionary note: 3
"Remember"
If anybody offers you pills, injections or types of pot you don't know, refuse
them. You can never be absolutely certain you're not going to get hooked.
35 The Handyside Case, supra note 25, at 11.
36 THn Sc HOOLBooK at 12.
37 Id. at 120-53.
38 Id. at 120.
39 Id. at 151-52.
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If you do accept, you must understand that by doing so you are losing part
of your freedom. This is the freedom to decide for yourself whether to stop
or take more. It may change your whole life.
Before you start you're free. Afterwards you're not free: the drug rules your
life.
Drugs won't solve your problems. The only way to solve problems is to
change the things that cause them not to try to escape or drop out altogether.
The Schoolbook's drug section is but one example of the intelligent, straight-
forward, and accurate discussion the book offers in areas of knowledge important
to every adolescent in modem society. To classify The Schoolbook as obscene
solely on the basis of its discussion of sexual matters calls into question the test
of obscenity utilized by the English courts."0 Yet the Court made no inquiries
as to the validity, or more precisely, the necessity, of the English criterion of
obscenity. The Court refused to examine the basis of the classification despite
Handyside's vigorous objection that the English criterion of obscenity was in-
compatible with the Article 10 requirement that any restriction on the right to
freedom of expression must be necessary for the protection of morals in a demo-
cratic society. The Court, like the Commission, failed to address these objections
and assumed the necessity of the Acts. On that assumption, the Court upheld as
reasonable the English courts' determination that The Schoolbook was obscene.
Under Article 10, before the Court could reach a decision as to the obscenity
of The Schoolbook, it was under a duty to examine carefully whether the Acts'
criterion of obscenity was a necessary and thus valid one. Had such an exami-
nation been made by the Court, the English criterion of obscenity could not have
been upheld as necessary for the protection of morals in a democratic society.
IV. The Obscene Publications Acts:
Background History and Criticisms
Prior to the Acts, the law relating to obscenity in the United Kingdom was
based on the 1868 case of R. v. Hicklin.4' Hicklin involved the prosecution of a
seller of pamphlets entitled "The Confessional Unmasked."42 Lord Justice Cock-
burn, in holding the pamphlets obscene and their seller guilty of a misdemeanor,
stated the test of obscenity as:
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.
43
In 1957, an Obscene Publications Bill, predecessor of the Acts, was brought
before Parliament for consideration. A Select Committee was appointed to
investigate the desirability of amending and consolidating the law relating to
40 See note 27 supra.
41 R. v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
42 The pamphlet purported to show the depravity of the Romish priesthood and the in-
quity of the Confessional and the questions put to women in confession.
43 L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
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obscene publications. 4 During its investigations, the Committee entertained
memoranda and oral testimony from a number of authorities in the area of
obscene publications. The Committees minutes demonstrate the manifest
problems with the Hicklin test.
Following are excerpts from the minutes of evidence taken during the Com-
mittee's examination of Sir Theobald Mathew, the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions at that time.45 The Committee examiners questioning Sir Mathew are Mr.
Elwyn Jones, Mr. Roy Jenkins, Mr. Simon and Viscount Lambton.
Jones: Have you . . . been conscious of the unsatisfactory state of the
law in regard to obscenity?
Mathew: .. . I think it is very difficult . .. when you are dealing with
expressions like "calculated to corrupt and deprave" to get an
objective yardstick . . . it must vary very considerably either
way....
Jenkins: Would not it suggest to you that the law was in a rather un-
usually vague state . .. ?
Mathew: I think I said or conceded earlier that as far as I am prepared
to go on policy, anything . . . that depends upon what is the
meaning of "calculated to corrupt and deprave" must always
be extremely difficult. There is no yardstick by which you can
judge what is "calculated to corrupt and deprave."
*X * * * *k -
Mathew: . . . I do not know, and I do not suppose anybody else knows,
what corrupts. (emphasis added)
46
Lambton: I think you would agree that there are certainly in circulation
now a large number of books which are . . . pornographic in
content ... but which do not arouse your interest because they
are not brought to your notice.
Mathew: I am quite prepared to accept that there is a great deal of porno-
graphic literature which does not come my way. (emphasis
added)
44 Evidence was obtained from the Home Secretary, the Director of Public Prosecutions,
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Society of Authors, Publishers Association and
Association of Chief Officers of Police of England and Wales, among others.
45 Minutes of Evidence, examination of Sir Theobald Mathew, Director of Public Pros-
ecutions, at 25-46 (May 27, 1957).
46 Id. Mathew recalled and further examined, (Jun. 3, 1957).
[October 1977]
[Vol. 53:90]
Lambton: Do you not think that these leave a loophole open for persecu-
tion of publisher or printer? ... If so, you might become, as it
were an instrument of persecution in the hands of somebody who
had an axe to grind? (emphasis added)
Mathew: I suppose it is always possible.
-* -* *X * *X *
Lambton: ... you said you did not mention the word "corrupt" because it
is so difficult to know what is corrupting. Now is not the law
as it stands based on this phrase that which would deprave or
corrupt those into whose hands this matter may fall? (emphasis
added)
Mathew: Yes.
Lambton: Are we then having to take a judgment ... framed on a law of
which you are not quite sure of the meaning? (emphasis added)
Mathew: No. I cannot give a definition in terms as to what is "corrupt"
... But if I look at material ... then I know.... But it is very
difficult ...
Lambton: And you might, therefore leave it as a weakness of the law, and
one of the reasons why it should therefore be changed, that,...
the Hicklin judgment is open to individual interpretation ...
(emphasis added)
Mathew: It is not what I think or say or what any other Director of
Public Prosecutions thinks or says. It is what the Magistrates
at one level and juries at another think.
Lambton: I am thinking about it before it goes to a jury. (emphasis added)
Lambton: . . .my point is that it does seem somewhat peculiar that for
ninety years we have been going on a judgment which the
Director of Public Prosecutions finds difficult to explain.
(emphasis added)
Mathew: If you think that is a fair way of summing up my evidence, I
will accept it....
In its final recommendations, the Committee noted the ambiguity of the
words "deprave and corrupt" and the desirability of removing uncertainty in the
law. The Committee, however, decided to retain the Hicklin test, stating that
"any amendment of the law relating to obscene publications is liable to be con-
troversial. To attempt too much might well give rise to fears that the law would
be unduly relaxed....", In its final form, the Committee's recommended statu-
47 Report from the Select Committee on Obscene Publications at iv (1958).
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tory definition of obscenity was couched in the following terms:
Any matter shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect as a whole is such as
to tend to deprave and corrupt persons to or among whom it was likely to be
distributed, circulated or offered for sale.48
A comparison of the Committee's recommended definition with the defini-
tion of obscenity incorporated in the Acts reveals how closely the Committee's
recommendations were followed. The test of obscenity under the Acts is:
[A]n article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect or ... the effect of any
one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt
persons who are likely ... to read, see or hear the matter contained.. ... 49
The Committee's minutes are germane to the issue of the necessity of the
Acts, since the test of obscenity contained in the Acts corresponds closely to the
Hicklin test.
The inadequacy of the criterion is dramatically illustrated by the 1968 case
of R. v. Calder and Boyars Ltd. The case involved a prosecution under the Acts
of the publishing firm of Calder and Boyars Ltd.,"0 for its publication of Last
Exit to Brooklyn. The book was declared obscene by a London Magistrate, and
the decision was affirmed by a jury at the Central Criminal Court. The defen-
dants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the trial
judge had inadequately instructed the jury as to the meaning of the statutory
definition of obscenity. The trial judge explained the legal test of obscenity em-
bodied in the Acts to the jury in the following manner:
Those . . . vital words "tend to deprave and corrupt" really mean just what
they say .... "Tend" obviously means have a tendency to or be inclined to.
"Deprave" is defined . . . as to make morally bad; to prevert or to corrupt
morally, and the word "corrupt" has been defined as "to render morally
unsound or to pervert" which brings us back pretty much to square one with
the other word. The essence of the matter you may think, is moral cor-
ruption.51
The Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the trial judge should
have explained the essence of moral corruption. The Court stated:
When, as here, a statute lays down the definition of a word or phrase in plain
English, it is rarely necessary and often unwise for the judge to attempt to
improve upon or re-define the definition.52 (emphasis added)
Paradoxically, the Court's assessment of the plain meaning of the words
"tend to deprave and corrupt" was contradicted by the assessment made by the
Director of Public Prosecutions involved in the case. In his response to an in-
48 Id.
49 See note 27 supra for the full text of the test of obscenity under the Acts.
50 R. v. Calder and Boyars Ltd., [1968] 3 W.L.R. 974 (C.A.).
51 Id. at 987.
52 Id. at 983.
[October 1977]
[Vol. 53:90]
quiry made by Calder and Boyars Ltd., prior to the publication of Last Exit
ta Brooklyn as to the likelihood of prosecution under the Acts, the Director
answered: "If you find... as I am afraid you will... that this is a most unhelp-
ful letter ... it is not because I wish to be unhelpful, but because I get no help
from the Acts.""3
The aim of this section has been to point out the many criticisms of the
Acts, demonstrating their inadequacy, obscurity, ineffectiveness and potential for
discriminatory enforcement. These criticisms shed doubt on the necessity of the
Acts for the protection of morals in a democratic society and thus call into ques-
tion the compatibility of the Acts with the right to freedom of expression con-
tained in Article 10 of the Convention. Despite these pervasive difficulties, the
Court made no attempt to assess whether the Acts constituted a necessary restric-
tion on the right to freedom of expression. The Court's failure to investigate the
Acts was directly related to its cursory treatment of the necessity of applying the
Acts to Handyside. These judicial failings may both be traced to a single source-
the doctrine of margin of appreciation.
V. Conclusion
In view of the preceding discussion of the doctrine of margin of appreciation
as it has evolved in the jurisprudence of the Commission and Court, the decision
of the Commission"4 and Court in the Handyside Case is not surprising. Never-
theless, the decision threatens not only the right to freedom of expression, but
the continued viability of the Convention itself.
The Commission and Court failed to examine: (1) The Schoolbook in its
entirety, independently of the English courts' references and conclusions; (2) the
necessity of the Acts themselves for the protection of morals; and (3) the neces-
sity of the application of the Acts to Handyside for the protection of morals. In
each respect, the approach is wholly consistent with past precedent. Consistency
in approach, however, does not signify accuracy in either interpretation or appli-
cation of the Convention. By their reliance on the doctrine, the Commission and
Court have established that under certain articles in the Convention there exists
a no-man's-land between compliance and contravention by a Member State, in
which the Commission and Court are powerless to intervene.
Why the Commission and Court should choose to rely on the doctrine of
margin of appreciation is open to speculation. Perhaps it reflects a natural reluc-
53 Note, Depravity and Corruption for the Public Good, 32 M.L.R. 198 (1969). The
unsatisfactory and ineffectual nature of the Acts is further demonstrated by the findings of a
1969 Working Party set up by the Acts Council of Britain to investigate the workings of the
Acts. The Working Party recommended repeal of the Acts. It found the Acts incapable of
overcoming the fact that no two people could agree on what is obscene. The Working Party
concluded:
[W]hen juries and defendants are without a comprehensive definition of the crime
alleged, the defendant is left at the mercy of a personal opinion which is a system
of censorship rather than a system of law . .. the laws against obscenity while con-
stituting a danger to the innocent private individual provide no serious benefit to
the public.
54 All references to the decision of the Commission in the Handyside case in this section
refer only to the decision of the majority of the Commission. A minority of the Commission
in The Handyside Case rejected the doctrine of margin of appreciation.
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tance on the part of the Commission and Court to find a Member State in breach
of the Convention. Or perhaps the reliance on the doctrine represents a politi-
cally motivated choice of action by a Commission and Court fearful of denun-
ciations, withdrawals, and flagrant breaches by Member States faced with a too
intrenchable enforcement of the Convention.
Whatever the explanation for the doctrine, it is clear that it seriously under-
mines the independence and ultimate decision-making power of the Commission
and Court. Without an effective machinery to hold Member States accountable
for their actions, the Convention's ability to preserve and enhance human rights
and fundamental freedoms is substantially impaired.
Cora S. Feingold
